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RECENT DECISIONS
the fire spreads over intervening lands, B not being an adjoining
landowner, A is not liable. 3 The reason for absence of liability
when fire spreads over intervening lands being that defendant has
no control over the material on that land. Liability attaches when
the fire on defendant's land spreads to the plaintiff's without the
intervention of any intermediate agencies. Defendant disclaims liability contending that inasmuch as neither party owned any part
of the intervening street they were not adjoining landowners. 4 Although a street intervened between the lands of the parties the fire
did not spread to the street and thence to the plaintiff's land but
spread directly to the land of the plaintiff so that the fire upon the
land of the defendant was the proximate cause of the destruction
of plaintiff's buildings. This decision modifies the general rule
in that it extends liability to an owner of land not adjoining plaintiff when the intervening land does not contribute to the spreading
of the negligent fire.
A. E. A.

PARTITION SALE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT FOR
vendee at a partition sale paid 10% of the bid but

SALE OF LAND.-A

on closing day refused to perform. Six months thereafter an order
directing the vendee to take title and make payment was obtained.
On appeal the order was affirmed. The purchaser defaulted on the
day set and on subsequent adjournments. Thereafter an order of
resale, providing that the purchaser at the sale will be liable for a
deficiency, was decreed. It was never vacated or modified. Subsequently purchaser assigned his rights. When the property fortuitously enhanced in value, the assignees moved for specific performance. Order was denied. On appeal, held, the assignees were not
entitled to the relief sought. They acquired no greater rights than
the assignor possessed. Bowen v. Horgan, 259 N. Y. 267, 181 N. E.
567 (1932).
The purchaser may assign his rights under the contract, thereby
transferring the same right to specific performance that he had.1 But
at the time of the assignment the vendee did not possess the right to
specific performance, he defaulted absolutely and thereby forfeited
it.2 Hence, the assignee did not acquire this right. An assignee
3Ibid.
'Matter of City of New York, szpra note 1; Ansorge v. Belfer, 248 N.
Y. 145, 161 N. .E. 450 (1928); Monogram Development Co. v. Natben Construction Co., 253 N. Y. 320, 171 N. E. 390 (1930).
' Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922) ; Langel v. Betz,
250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890 (1928).
2 Stagman v. Lasson, 345 Ill. 482, 178 N. E. 166 (1931); McDonald v.
Sautter, 346 Ill. 67, 178 N. E. 340 (1931); Haddaway v. Smith, 277 S. W. 728
(1925) (refusal to perform is a breach discharging the other party) ; Westown
Realty Co. v. Keller, 143 App. Div. 458, 128 N. Y. Supp. 518 (1st Dept. 1911).
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acquires no greater rights than the assignor had at the time of the
transfer.3 The default of the vendee was not waived. An insistent
ineffectual demand upon performance does not constitute a waiver
unless the other party can show an ability and willingness to substantially comply, 4 or that he was prevented by the acts of the party
demanding performance. 5 As the assignor could not come within
these principles the assignee cannot claim to be. This would be a
greater right.
When specific performance cannot be actually enforced the court
may provide that the property shall be resold and direct that the
defaulting party shall be liable for a deficiency, if any, as in a foreclosure action.6 Since the order of resale was for seller's benefit, he
should not be compelled to perform if he chooses to abandon it. A
party invoking the power of a court of equity is bound by its diswill result, the relief sought will be
cretion. If a travesty of justice
7
denied as in the instant case.
P. A. L.

RESCISSION-MINOR'S CONTRACT VOIDABLE, NOT VOID-MEAS-

URE OF DAMAGES

UPON

DISAFFIRMANcE.-Plaintiff,

an infant,

opened a stock account with a firm of brokers, which he subsequently
transferred to the defendants, who accepted the same by paying a
debit amount thereon to the former firm. These shares of stocks
were kept by the defendants as a security for the unpaid balance due
them from the plaintiff, which was continued with purchases and sales
until it was closed by a payment of a small sum. Plaintiff, while still
an infant, rescinded his agreement and disaffirmed his entire transaction. In an action to recover the amount which he alleges to represent the value of his interest at the time of his transfer of the stocks
8 Fairbanks

v. Sargent, 117 N. Y. 320, 22 N. E. 1039 (1889) ; Central Trust

Co. of N. Y. v. The West India Improvement Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E.
387 (1901).

"Fox v. Hutton, 142 Ark. 530, 219 S. W. 28 (1920) ; Quinn v. Daly, 300
Ill. 273, 133 N. E. 290 (1921); O'Donnell v. Henley, 327 Ill. 406, 158 N. E.
692 (1927); Haddaway v. Smith, spra note 2.
'Fox v. Hutton, supra note 4; Quinn v. Daly, supra note 4; Gladstone v.
Warshowsky, 332 Ill. 376, 163 N. E. 777 (1928); Stagman v. Lasson, supra
note 2; McDonald v. Sautter, supra note 2.
(it would seem
6 Williams v. Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144, 39 N. E. 825 (1895)
that the rule of equitable conversion is inapplicable after default) ; Strauss v.
Bendheim, 32 Misc. 179, 66 N. Y. Supp. 247 (1900).
1 Fisher v. Hersey, 78 N. Y. 387, 388 (1879) (the courts of equity exercise
control over sales made under their decrees which are not always controlled by
legal principles, but by its discretion). In Matter of Attorney-General v.
Continental Life Ins. Co., 94 N. Y. 199 (1883) (contract while executory is
within the power of the court) ; Westown Realty Co. v. Keller, supra note 2
(purchaser not allowed to speculate on property) ; Leahy v. Leahy, 116 Misc.
330, 189 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1921).

